Auroville Residents Have No Right To Be Part Of Council/Committee Formed By Foundation’s Governing Body : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court on Monday (March 17) held that the Residents’ Assembly or any individual resident of the Auroville Foundation cannot claim any right to be a part of a Committee or Council constituted by the Governing Board of the Foundation.

A bench comprising Justice Bela M Trivedi and Justice Prasana B Varale set aside the Madras High Court’s order which quashed the standing order of 1st June 2022 constituting the Auroville Town Development Council (ATDC). The High Court had quashed the ATDC constitution, inter alia, on the ground that it was formed without the aid and advice of the Residents’ Assembly.

Allowing the Auroville Foundation’s appeal against the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court observed that as per the Auroville Foundation Act or the Rules made thereunder, no legal or statutory right conferred upon the Residents’ Assembly or upon any individual resident to be part of the Committee or the Council constituted by the Governing Council.

The Supreme Court held that the functions of the Residents’ Assembly are confined only to advising the Governing Board in respect of the activities relating to residents of Auroville and to make recommendations as specified in Section 19 of the AF Act and not any further.

The Court observed that the High Court “thoroughly misdirected itself in misinterpreting the provisions of the AF Act and in setting aside the impugned notification containing Standing Order dated 01.06.2022.”

Petition filed by disgruntled residents to hamper development of Auroville

Pronouncing the verdict, Justice Trivedi said, “Some disgruntled and discontented residents kept on filing the petitions one after the other, dragging the Foundation into unnecessary litigations. The writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court was one of such ill-motivated petitions filed by her to abuse the process of law to hamper the development of Auroville and to cause obstructions to the smooth functioning of the Governing Board of the Foundation.”

While allowing the appeal, the Court imposed a cost of Rs 50,000 on the respondent Natasha Storey which is to be deposited before the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within two weeks. In a related development, the Supreme Court also allowed another appeal filed by the Auroville Foundation against the NGT’s bar on township expansion project.

The High Court bench of the then Chief Justice Sanjay V. Gangapurwala and Mr. Justice D. Bharatha Chakravarthy delivered the judgment in March 2024, setting aside the constitution of the ATDC. The High Court observed that the residents’ participation in the planning and implementation of the Master Plan was necessary.

“The performance of the functions required by the Act and all the activities relating to the residents of Auroville are vested with the Residents’ Assembly under Section 19 of the Act. It can be seen that it is the Residents’ Assembly that has to carry out those functions and day-to-day activities, not directly by itself, but, by aiding and advising the Governing Board,” the High Court had observed.

The High Court held that the Standing Order granting power to the Governing Board to appoint any person as a member of the ATDC without the advice and consultation of the Residents’ Assembly was ultra vires the Act.

Case : THE AUROVILLE FOUNDATION VS. NATASHA STOREY | DIARY NO. – 13723/2024

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Motor Accident Claims | ‘Legal Representative’ Is One Who Suffers Loss; Need Not Be Spouse, Child Or Parent Of Deceased : Supreme Court

Recently, the bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra have held that legal representative under the Motor Vehicles Act (MVA) includes dependents of the deceased, not just immediate heirs. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Sadhana Tomar & Ors. v. Ashok Kushwaha & Ors.  (2025). 

What was the Background of Sadhana Tomar & Ors. v. Ashok Kushwaha & Ors. Case? 

  • On 25th September 2016, Dheeraj Singh Tomar (24 years old) was traveling in an auto-rickshaw (registration No. MP 30-R-0582) along with other passengers. 
  • The driver of the auto-rickshaw was driving rashly and negligently when the vehicle overturned at Gohad Chauraha Road near Gautum Nagar, Bajrang Washing Centre at Gwalior. 
  • As a result of this accident, Dheeraj Singh Tomar died on the spot, while other passengers suffered injuries. 
  • The appellants (dependents of the deceased) filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) seeking compensation of Rs. 28,50,000/-. 
  • The appellants submitted that the deceased was earning approximately Rs. 35,000/- per month from his wholesale fruit selling business, which he used to support his family’s daily expenses. 
  • The MACT observed that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (the driver and owner of the vehicle) were jointly and severally liable to pay compensation because the driver was operating the vehicle without a valid and effective driving licence at the time of the accident. 
  • The MACT awarded compensation of Rs. 9,77,200/- with simple interest at 7% per annum to appellant Nos. 1 to 3, calculating based on a notional income of Rs. 4,500/- per month with future prospects at 40%. 
  • The MACT made a deduction of 1/3rd from the calculated amount for personal expenses and did not consider Appellant Nos. 4 and 5 (the father and younger sister of the deceased) as dependents. 
  • Aggrieved by the compensation amount, the claimant-appellants filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, challenging the determination of monthly income and the deduction methodology. 
  • The High Court affirmed the MACT’s findings regarding the compensation amount but directed the insurance company to pay the compensation to the claimants and then recover it from the driver and owner of the offending vehicle. 
  • Still dissatisfied with the outcome, the claimant-appellants approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the monthly income was incorrectly assessed, and the appropriate multiplier was not applied.

What were the Court’s Observations?

  • The Supreme Court disagreed with the Tribunal and High Court’s assessment of the deceased’s monthly income at Rs. 4,500/-. 
  • The Court noted that while the claimants could not conclusively prove the deceased’s income, it was evident that the accident had taken away a potential earning member of the family. 
  • Referring to the Minimum Wages Act Notification of 2016, the Court determined that the monthly income for an unskilled worker was fixed at Rs. 6,500/-, bringing the annual income to Rs. 78,000/-. 
  • The Court determined that appellant Nos. 4 and 5 (father and younger sister), both not financially independent, would qualify as legal representatives for compensation purposes under the Motor Vehicles Act, as they were dependent on the deceased’s income from his wholesale fruit business. 
  • As a result, the Court adjusted the deduction for personal expenses from 1/3rd to 1/4th, accounting for five dependent family members instead of three. 
  • The Court maintained the High Court’s direction for the Insurance Company to first pay the compensation and then recover it from the driver and owner who were jointly and severally liable due to the lack of valid driving licence. 
  • Based on these observations, the Supreme Court recalculated the compensation to Rs. 17,52,500/- (increased from the MACT and High Court’s Rs. 9,77,200/-), with interest as awarded by the Tribunal. 

What are the Landmark Cases Referred to in this Case? 

  • National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh & Ors. [(2004) 3 SCC 297] – Referenced by the High Court in their judgment to establish that the insurance company should pay the compensation and then recover it from the owner and driver. 
  • National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] – Referenced to establish that the appropriate multiplier for a 24-year-old person is 18. 
  • Meena Devi v. Nunu Chand Mahto [(2023) 1 SCC 204] – Referenced to emphasize that the objective of granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is to ensure just and fair compensation to the aggrieved party. 
  • Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [(1987) 3 SCC 234] – Referenced to establish that a “legal representative” is one who suffers due to the death of a person in a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be limited to a wife, husband, parent or child. 
  • N. Jayasree v. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd. [(2022) 14 SCC 712] – Referenced to support giving a wider interpretation to the term “legal representative” under Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) emphasizing that proving loss of dependency is sufficient to claim compensation. 

What is Section 166 of MV Act? 

  • Section 166(1)(c) permits “all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased” to make an application for compensation where death has resulted from an accident. 
  • The proviso to Section 166(1) mandates that when all legal representatives have not joined in filing the compensation application, those who have not joined must be impleaded as respondents. 
  • The term “legal representative” should be interpreted broadly and not be confined to its narrow definition under succession laws. 
  • A legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a spouse, husband, parent, or child. 
  • The qualification to be considered a legal representative is primarily the establishment of “loss of dependency.” 
  • Any person who can demonstrate dependence on the deceased’s income and consequent financial loss due to their death qualifies as a legal representative. 
  • This interpretation serves the benevolent objective of the Motor Vehicles Act to provide monetary relief to victims or their families affected by motor accidents. 
  • The legislative intent of Section 166 is to ensure that every person who suffers financially due to the death has a legal remedy for obtaining compensation. 
  • The Motor Vehicles Act, being remedial and beneficial legislation, calls for a liberal interpretation of its provisions, including the term “legal representative.” 
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Section 47 CPC Applications Raising Property Rights After Passing Of Decree To Be Treated As Application Under Order 21 Rule 97 : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recently observed that an application filed under Section 47 of CPC relating to the determination of questions related to the execution of the decree would be deemed as an application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 if it raises questions of right, title, or interest in the property.

The Court clarified that while applications under Section 47 of the CPC and Order 21 Rule 97 address distinct proceedings— with the former concerning execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree and the latter dealing with resistance or obstruction to possession, including by third parties— an application under Section 47 filed by a judgment debtor or an aggrieved third party will be treated as one under Order 21 Rule 97 if it raises questions of right, title, or interest in the property. In such cases, the executing court must adjudicate these questions under Order 21 Rule 101.

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A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Pankaj Mithal heard the case, in which the respondents filed an application under Section 47 of CPC after a decree was passed in the appellant’s favor, asserting their status as bona fide cultivating tenants to prevent their dispossession from the property.

In the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala, the Court observed that although the respondent had filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC—where the executing court is not required to adjudicate issues related to rights, interest, or title in the property—it would be treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, eliminating the need for a separate application under that provision.

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The Court reasoned that since the application under Section 47 CPC raises objections concerning rights in the property, which the executing court cannot determine after the decree has been passed, reclassifying it as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC would empower the executing court to adjudicate such issues. This approach aligns with the legal principle that the executing court cannot question the validity of the decree or go beyond its scope.

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Applying the law to the facts, the Court observed that the respondents had claimed to be bona fide cultivating tenants to resist dispossession after the decree was passed—an issue they could have raised during the trial. Consequently, the Court treated their Section 47 application as one under Order 21 Rule 97 and adjudicated it under Rule 101. It ultimately held that the respondents had failed to establish an independent right to possession and that their objections were collusive, raised only after the decree was passed.

In such circumstances referred to above the application of the respondents No. 1 and 2 under Section 47 of the CPC bearing R.E.A. No. 163 of 2011 was in substance an application for determination of their possessory rights under Order XXI Rule 97.”, the Court observed.

Also From JudgmentDirect Courts To Dispose Execution Petitions Within 6 Months, Hold Presiding Officer Liable On Failure : Supreme Court Asks High Courts

Case Details: PERIYAMMAL (DEAD THR. LRS.) AND ORS Versus V. RAJAMANI AND ANR. ETC|SLP(C) No. 8490-8492/2020

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Click here to read the judgment

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Revenue Entries Don’t Confer Title But Are Admissible As Evidence Of Possession: Supreme Court

Though revenue entries do not confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession, observed the Supreme Court in a recent judgment.

“Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence,” the Court observed.

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The Court also reiterated that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of private citizens.

“Allowing the State to appropriate private property through adverse possession would undermine the constitutional rights of citizens and erode public trust in the government,” observed a bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B Varale.

The observation was made in a judgment dismissing an appeal filed by the State of Haryana raising a claim of adverse possession against a property of private individuals.

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The private parties had filed a civil suit in 1981 in respect of a land measuring 18 Biswas Pukhta adjoining the National Highway 10, alleging that the Haryana Public Works Department had unauthorisedly occupied it. The State opposed the suit claiming that they had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit land since 1879-80 and had perfected title through adverse possession.

The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. However, the first appellate court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. In second appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High Court restored the decree, against which the State approached the Supreme Court.

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The Supreme Court noted that by claiming adverse possession, the State had impliedly admitted the title of the plaintiffs. The revenue record entries, sale deeds and mutation entries also established the title of the plaintiffs.

Rejecting the claim of adverse possession, the Supreme Court stated, “it is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens.” Reference was made to the judgment in Vidya Devi v. State of H.P(2020) 2 SCC 569.

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The Court also held that the acts relied upon by the appellants—such as placing bitumen drums, erecting temporary structures, and constructing a boundary wall in 1980—do not constitute adverse possession.

“Adverse possession requires possession that is continuous, open, peaceful, and hostile to the true owner for the statutory period. In this case, the appellants’ possession lacks the element of hostility and the requisite duration,” the Court observed.

Appearances: Additional Solicitor General Vikramjit Banerjee for the State; Senior Advocate Santhosh Paul for the respondents.

Case : The State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (Since deceased) through Legal Representatives

Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 900

Click here to read the judgment

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